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Introduction: Does Labour Law Need Philosophical Foundations?
Hugh Collins,* Gillian Lester** and Virginia Mantouvalou***

Philosophical foundations of labour law is emerging as a new field of scholarship. As far as we
know, a book on this subject has not yet been published, though in recent years several
exploratory articles and book chapters have directly addressed the theme.1 In addition, some
monographs that engage with philosophy have examined aspects of labour law such as
dismissal, the statutory minimum wage, freedom of association, recognition of trade unions for
the purpose of collective bargaining, and the right to work.2 Building on those initiatives, this
collection of essays tries to develop a philosophical perspective on the subject of labour law as
a whole. At its heart this enquiry concerns the moral and political ideas, values, and principles
that underpin conceptions of the foundations, purposes, and scope of the field of law known as
labour law. The contributors to this volume illuminate and critically examine the meaning,
application, and interconnection of these foundational ideas, values, and principles that shape
labour law. Going beyond many fruitful enquiries into the purposes and rationale of labour
law,3 the essays try to uncover the moral ideals and principles that provide the foundations or
assumptions that support the differing views that have been expressed about the aims and
purposes of labour law. This collection of essays offers the opportunity to shape for the first
time a wide ranging and pluralist philosophical enquiry into the foundations of labour law,
which in turn is likely to influence the development of the subject and the law in the future.
For centuries, of course, there has been lively and thoughtful philosophical discussion of
closely related topics such as the nature and meaning of work, the quality of the social relation
between master and servant (or slave), the nature of exploitation, the need for democracy in
economic institutions such as firms, and the demands of justice in the distribution of the
benefits of work. 4 But the topic of why and how the law regulates and ought to regulate work
* Vinerian Professor of English Law, All Souls College, University of Oxford.
** Dean and Lucy G. Moses Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.
*** Professor of Human Rights and Labour Law, UCL, Faculty of Laws.
1
E.g. Horacio Spector ‘Philosophical Foundations of Labour Law’ (2006) 33 Florida State University Law
Review 1119; Brian Langille, ‘Labour Law’s Theory of Justice’ in Guy Davidov and Brian Langille (eds), The
Idea of Labour Law (OUP 2011) 101; Hugh Collins, ‘Theories of Rights as Justifications for Labour Law’ in Guy
Davidov and Brian Langille (eds), The Idea of Labour Law (OUP 2011); Riccardo Del Punta, ‘Labour Law and
the Capability Approach’ (2016) 32 International Journal of Comparative Labour law and Industrial Relations’
383; David Cabrelli and Rebecca Zahn, ‘Special Issue: Theories of Domination and Labour Law: A New
Conception for Legal Intervention?’ (2017) 33 International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial
Relations 331; Alan Bogg, ‘Labour, Love and Futility: Philosophical Perspectives on Labour Law’ (2017) 33
International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 7.
2
E.g. Hugh Collins, Justice in Dismissal (OUP 1992); Sheldon Leader, Freedom of Association: A Study in Labor
Law and Political Theory (Yale UP 1992); Alan Bogg, The Democratic Aspects of Trade Union Recognition (Hart
2009); Virginia Mantouvalou (ed), The Right to Work: Legal and Philosophical Perspectives (Hart 2015).
3
E.g. Hugh Collins, ‘Labour Law as a Vocation’ (1989) 105 Law Quarterly Review 468; Hugh Collins, ‘The
Productive Disintegration of Labour law’ (1997) 26 Industrial Law Journal 295; Guy Davidov and Brian Langille
(eds), The Idea of Labour Law (OUP 2011); Guy Davidov, A Purposive Approach to Labour Law (OUP 2016).
4
See e.g. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (University of Chicago Press 1958); Karl Marx, Economic and
Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (Dirk Struik (ed), International Publishers 1964); John Locke, Second Treatise
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and relations in the workplace is rarely mentioned in philosophical analysis. Rather than
engaging in much philosophical enquiry, the subject of labour law has in the past mostly
comprised technical legal analysis for the purpose of assisting legal practice, or evaluative
discussion about the policies embodied in legislation, or calls for activist interventions through
the legal process and collective industrial action by workers. This book provides an opportunity
to stand back from those other valuable activities and contemplate more fully the central moral
and political principles that go to the core of the existence of labour law as a field of legal
practice and scholarship. Should we embrace this opportunity?

1. The Case for Examining Philosophical Foundations
The claim that it is a good time for philosophical contemplation is not to deny that ultimately
the point of labour law is to do something. One of labour law’s key tasks is to provide a
countervailing force against the power of owners of business organisations in support of
workers, who, because they have nothing to sell but their labour, suffer from an inherent
weakness of bargaining power that can lead to exploitation.5 The countervailing force can be
achieved in many ways including mandatory protective laws and support for collective
bargaining and industrial action through which workers can negotiate better terms of
employment. As discussed in this book and elsewhere, labour law performs many other
important tasks, ranging from protection of the dignity and liberty of workers to the basic task
of the facilitation of the cooperation needed for an advanced division of labour in a market
economy. The identification and pursuit of these practical goals clearly does not depend upon
a philosophical understanding of the values and principles that may underlie labour law.
Instead of philosophical contemplation, it may appear more important to carry out other kinds
of research such as empirical assessment of the effects of legislation in order to discover how
best to achieve the goals of labour law through legal regulation.6
Moreover, labour law is often infertile terrain for reflection upon coherent underlying
principles. In devising the laws and legal institutions, much of the detailed rules and standard
labour laws are the product of political conflict in the legislature and sometimes in the streets.
Laws that are produced through politics are always provisional settlements of these conflicts
of interest and ideologies that will be open to contestation. The balance of political forces and
of Government, in John Locke, Two Treatises of Government: A Critical Edition (Peter Laslett ed, 2nd edn, CUP
1967); Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, vol 2 (International Publishers 1967); Carole
Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (CUP 1970); Adina Schwartz, ‘Meaningful Work’ (1982) 92
Ethics 634; Robert Dahl, A Preface to Economic Democracy (University of California Press 1985);
Andrew Reeve (ed), Modern Theories of Exploitation (Sage Publications 1987); Gerry A. Cohen, History, Labour,
and Freedom: Themes from Marx (OUP 1989); James Bernard Murphy, The Moral Economy of Labour (Yale
University Press 1993); Michael Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent (Harvard University Press 1996); Alan
Wertheimer, Exploitation (Princeton University Press 1999); Kory P Schaff (ed), Philosophy and the Problems
of Work: A Reader (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2001); Ruth Sample, Exploitation: What It Is and Why It’s
Wrong (Rowman and Littlefield 2003); Iris M Young, ‘Responsibility and Global Labor Justice’ (2004) 12 Journal
of Political Philosophy 365; Andrea Veltman, Meaningful Work (OUP 2016).
5
P. Davies and M. Freedland, Kahn-Freund’s Labour and the Law (3rd edn, Stevens, 1983) 18.
6
For examples of insightful empirical research, see e.g. Lizzie Barmes, Bullying and Behavioural Conflict at
Work (OUP 2016) and Lydia Hayes, Stories of Care: A Labour of Law (Palgrave 2017). On prospects and
challenges for empirical labour law research, see Amy Ludlow and Alysia Blackham (eds), New Frontiers in
Empirical Labour Law Research (Hart 2015).

2

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3333095

the popularity of political parties explain the detailed content and nature of those legal
outcomes at any particular time. In view of the shifting and often pragmatic goals and measures
of labour law, the question must arise whether it is even possible to have a philosophy of a
subject that concerns an area of law that often appears to dispense with coherent legal principles
in favour of a patchwork of regulations that have been devised to satisfy short-term political
agendas. Does it make any sense to look for coherent philosophical foundations of moral and
political principles for a subject like labour law that is so clearly the product of historical and
pragmatic political compromises?
Although no doubt there is much to be said in favour of the argument that labour law demands
action rather than contemplation, there are some important reasons for believing that the aims
of labour law cannot be secured unless we articulate its philosophical foundations. 7 We suggest
that it is essential and inevitable to stand back from the political compromises and ad hoc
measures to consider and spell out explicitly what are the key attributes of the subject and its
foundational goals and principles. We also suggest that in order to identify what it is that labour
law needs to do and whether it is successful in doing it, we must think about its philosophical
foundations. We need a normative account of labour law in order to assess its shortcomings
and propose reforms. To assess the success of legal and civil society institutions, we need to
consider against what this success is assessed: do we assess it against the ideas of workers’
equality or liberty, against everyone’s social inclusion, or against the promotion of workers’
dignity? And what is the meaning of each of these concepts? It is easy to lose sight of the
broader picture when one is engaged in the resistance to some apparently technical measure
that may have adverse practical ramifications for workers in employment. The same can be
said about empirical research findings: we suggest that they may be of limited significance
unless they are assessed against a normative framework that explains what is just and what is
unjust in the workplace. Political action and empirical study, on the one hand, and normative
theory, on the other, have to go hand in hand.
Yet, probably the most important reasons for pursuing a philosophical agenda at this time
concern very large questions. These involve the continuing existence of the subject of labour
law and the paradigm around which it is built. As well as the significance of those questions
for the destiny of the subject of labour law as a whole, philosophical enquiry has the potential
to throw valuable light on a whole range of difficult issues and concepts that arise within labour
law. We need to explain briefly these key tasks for an enquiry into the philosophical
foundations of labour law.

(a) The Existence of Labour Law.
The need for labour law has often been questioned, and perhaps no more so than today when
the very idea of labour law is under attack. 8 A major challenge to the existence of labour law
comes from the direction of libertarian political philosophies.9 Apart from the protection of
rights to private property, on a strong libertarian view, pretty much all that is required from
7

See Arthurs in this volume.
Alan Hyde, ‘The Idea of the Idea of Labour Law: A Parable’ in Davidov and Langille (n 3).
9
Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (Basic Books 1974); Friedrich A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and
Liberty (Routledge & Kegan Paul 1982).
8
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government is the legal enforcement of contracts freely concluded between those wishing to
acquire and use labour power and those seeking to sell it in return for wages. On this view that
treats the provision of work personally much like the sale of any other commodity, an employer
and employee can and should use the ordinary law of contract to regulate their relations to their
mutual benefit, without the need for any special rules for contracts of employment. As well as
being unnecessary, the libertarian view holds that labour law is extremely undesirable. One
reason given for rejecting labour law is that libertarians assert that legal regulation of
employment tends to create inefficiency and inelasticity in the labour market by interfering
with freedom of contract. As a consequence, labour law may end up ‘back-firing’:10 by
increasing the costs of employment to employers from the need for compliance with the law,
it may depress demand for labour, with the possible consequences of reduction of wage levels
and unemployment.
Moreover, on the libertarian view, any mandatory laws about employment relations are wrong
in principle, because they do not fully respect the rights of the parties to self-determination or
autonomy, but instead impose improper paternalist controls over the labour market and
employment relations. The political manifestation of such libertarian views includes such
policies as getting rid of ‘red tape’, a category that tends to include all mandatory labour laws,
and laws against discrimination. 11 This view also supports the reduction of the power of trade
unions and organised labour by placing restrictions on the right to organise or the right to strike
on the ground that the activities of trade unions interfere with the operation of a free market.
The libertarian view can also be used to justify measures designed to make access to specialised
agencies and the courts to enforce specialised employment rights more difficult or more
expensive, because easy access to justice may encourage frivolous and wasteful claims.
Libertarians are likely to concede that sometimes the unregulated market produces the
consequence that individuals may lose nearly all their rights and freedoms – in which case, it
is appropriate to pass laws against such comprehensive denials of rights, such as the crimes of
modern slavery and human trafficking. But these measures are not perceived as invidiously
paternalistic like other labour laws, but merely laws to prevent the free market from
undermining a libertarian social order in which everyone’s basic liberties are fully respected.12
Versions of these libertarian views have achieved prominence in politics in recent years,
especially in North America and the United Kingdom. Labour lawyers correctly perceive that
such arguments in favour of a simple regime of freedom of contract and the freedom of a
business to conduct its affairs without detailed regulation of employment relations foreshadow
the demise of labour law. To be a libertarian labour lawyer would be to commit professional
suicide. To resist such arguments for the abolition of a special set of rules to govern
employment relations, it is necessary to address critically the fundamental assumptions of the
libertarian position. One major presupposition insists on the efficiency of an unregulated labour
market; and the other is the claim that to properly respect the rights of the individual, it is
necessary to avoid any kind of paternalist mandatory laws. Whilst the former claim can be
effectively challenged by more sophisticated economic models of the operation of the labour

Cass Sunstein, ‘Paradoxes of the Regulatory State’ (1990) 57 University of Chicago law Review 407 (though
Sunstein does not endorse the libertarian position).
11
Richard A. Epstein, Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against Employment Discrimination Laws (Harvard
University Press 1992).
12
Exceptionally, Nozick (n 9) 331 holds to the view that contracts for slavery should be permitted.
10
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market in the context of a state that provides a social security system, 13 the latter claim about
the incompatibility of labour law with a state that fully respects the rights of individuals can be
assessed by philosophical reflection. In particular, a libertarian will object to the state telling
employers what value they should place on the labour of others, how they should run their
businesses, and dictating the terms of their contracts through mandatory regulations.
Does labour law violate the basic liberties and rights of persons? The starting point for
libertarians is the proposition that interference with freedom of contract is incompatible with
the value of freedom or liberty of the individual, a value that they cherish. It is plainly true, for
instance, that a minimum wage law takes away the freedom of both employer and employee to
choose the terms on which they will enter a transaction, for agreed wages below the minimum
wage will be invalidated by the law and replaced with the statutory minimum. Is this
mandatory law therefore an impermissible interference with the freedom of employers and
workers? The decision of the Supreme Court in Lochner v New York14 haunts us to this day: is
a law that sets maximum hours for workers in order to protect their health necessarily a
wrongful and unconstitutional interference with their liberty as the US Supreme Court decided?
To answer that question, we need to develop a deeper, philosophical understanding of concepts
like human rights, dignity, freedom, and respect for the equality of persons. It is too simple to
say that liberty has been damaged simply because the law prevents people from selecting an
option that might lead to exploitation and damage to their health.
A better understanding of the value of liberty might claim, for instance, that freedom is only
valuable if it provides individuals with worthwhile opportunities and the capability of seizing
some of those opportunities. On this view, precarious, exploitative, and dangerous jobs are not
worthwhile opportunities to have, so that deprivation of those opportunities is not an
interference with an exercise of freedom that anyone should value. Moreover, one should
question the assumption made by libertarians that unregulated markets involve dealings
between free and equal persons achieved through ordinary contractual arrangements. 15 A
typical employment relation involves the worker’s submission to a one-sided contract drawn
up unilaterally by the employer. This asymmetry in the labour market arises in general because
only one party, the employer, owns substantial property, the means of production, which places
structural constraints on the freedom of the other party, the employee to refuse offers of
employment.16 In the context of employment, there has to be a better interpretation of freedom
that takes account of workers’ material conditions. 17
This better understanding of the concept of freedom in the context of employment needs also
to incorporate two further special features of typical contracts of employment. First, under the
Frank Wilkinson and Simon Deakin, Labour Standards – Essential to Economic and Social Progress (Institute
of Employment Rights 1996); Simon Deakin and Frank Wilkinson, ‘Labour Law and Economic Theory: A
Reappraisal’ in Hugh Collins, Paul Davies and Roger Rideout (eds), Legal Regulation of the Employment Relation
(Kluwer Law International 2000); Hugh Collins, ‘Justifications and Techniques of Legal Regulation of the
Employment Relation’ in Hugh Collins, Paul Davies and Roger Rideout (eds), Legal Regulation of the
Employment Relation (Kluwer Law International 2000).
14
198 US 45 (1905).
15
For discussion of freedom in relation to the employment contract, see Gardner in this volume.
16
Gerry A. Cohen, ‘Capitalism, Freedom and the Proletariat’, in Alan Ryan (ed), The Idea of Freedom: Essays in
Honour of Isaiah Berlin (OUP 1979) 11-14.
17
On freedom and material conditions, see e.g. ibid; see also Jeremy Waldron, ‘Homelessness and the Issue of
Freedom’, in Liberal Rights – Collected Papers (CUP 1993); Gerry A. Cohen, ‘Freedom and Money’ (2001) 2
Revista Argentina de Teoria Juridica 1.
13
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terms of employment contracts, the employer acquires the right to direct and manage
employees, and employees are obliged to obey those instructions. This structure of power and
subordination appears to confer a discretionary power on the employer that often seems to be
the very opposite of a free and equal relationship. Workers are frequently in a relation of
something that is more aptly described as master and servant relation than business partnership.
Second, the employer’s power extends in practice not only to complete control over the
workplace in every aspect, but also to the ability to tear up the contract almost at will and set
new terms for the arrangement. This additional power stems from the employer’s power to
terminate the contract of employment by summary dismissal. Although national legislation
differs in the constraints placed on employers with respect to dismissal, with few countries
having the equivalent of the American doctrine of termination at will, the employer’s power to
threaten to terminate the contract unless employees agree to contractual modifications or extracontractual performance is invariably strong. This power reduces the contract of employment
to a bargain that, unlike most binding legal contracts, has surprisingly little effective coercive
force. Employees may object to a wage cut or an imposed variation in duties, but the employer
can impose these changes usually at very little cost. If the workers do not go along with the
new arrangements, they can be dismissed and find themselves unemployed, and replaced by
others who will accede to the employer’s demands. When these two features of the one-sided
deal that can be unilaterally adjusted to the interests of one part are combined in the contract
of employment, they create a unique kind of transaction. This context reveals that the freedom
and equality that are presupposed by libertarians to exist in all contractual relations assume a
special deviant form in contracts of employment, in which the essence of the contract in some
respects is for the worker to sacrifice freedom and equality.
Threats to the existence of labour law depend on intellectual perspectives and frameworks that
essentially liken employment to other kinds of transactions, such as sales of goods. But labour
is not a commodity. Nor is the contract of employment really a textbook type of freely
negotiated contract: its terms are normally dictated unilaterally; they confer discretionary
power on the employer to vary the employee’s performance obligations; and through threats of
termination can always be altered unilaterally in the interests of the employer. Employment is
more of an autocratic governance mechanism than a contractual bargain. 18 How may
philosophical reflection contribute to countering the agenda voiced by libertarians?
To be sure, ideas such as inequality and subordination are already widespread in discussions
of labour law, as in the frequent references to the inequality of bargaining power between
employer and employee. Values such as equality and dignity have also been discussed,
especially in connection with laws against discrimination in employment,19 but also in the

18

Elizabeth Anderson, Private Government (Princeton University Press 2017). For explorations of this idea in
this volume see: David Cabrelli and Rebecca Zahn; and Hugh Collins.
19
This book mostly excludes the law of discrimination because its philosophical foundations have been explored
extensively elsewhere, including a volume in this series: Deborah Hellman and Sophie Moreau (eds),
Philosophical Foundations of Discrimination Law (OUP 2013). C.f. Larry Alexander, ‘What makes Wrongful
Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies’ (1992) 141 University of Penn State Law
Review 149; John Gardner, ‘On the Ground of Her Sex(uality)’ (1998) 18 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 167;
Deborah Hellman, When is Discrimination Wrong? (Harvard University Press 2008); Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen,
Born Free and Equal: A Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature of Discrimination (OUP 2013); Benjamin Eidelson,
Discrimination and Disrespect (OUP 2015); Tarunabh Khaitan, A Theory of Discrimination Law (OUP 2015);
Hugh Collins and Tarunabh Khaitan (eds), Foundations of Indirect Discrimination Law (Hart/Bloomsbury 2018).
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context of the contract of employment. 20 Wrongs such as exploitation have been analysed in
connection with laws against forced labour, trafficking, and modern slavery. However, there is
limited theoretical exploration of these ideas as the underlying justification of labour laws and
their broader implications for legal intervention. To resist the challenge to the existence of
labour law posed by libertarians, we need to be much clearer about the ways in which the
contract of employment subverts liberal values such as rights, dignity, liberty and equality, and
about the broader structures that make workers vulnerable to exploitation. A more precise
understanding of the tension between libertarianism and liberal values helps us to understand
exactly why labour law is needed, how it should be interpreted, and what it should do. It can
give a strong intellectual support to labour law, which will be important for workers and their
organisations, scholars, judges, and legislators.

(b) The Paradigms of Labour Law
Labour law has never been entirely sure about its special province or scope.21 Indeed, the
subject has never settled on its own name. Should it be called, as it has been at various times
in the last century, industrial law, labour law, employment law, work law? Different names
reveal varied historical contexts and economic systems; to some extent they reflect the
evolution in America and Europe from the heavy industry of mass production to modern
service networks, global supply chains, and the emerging gig economy. As well as historical
circumstance, the changes in name often signify different priorities and scope for the subject.
When we choose a label for a field of study, we are not simply launching a descriptive account
of various laws. The label derives implicitly from a conception of the subject that describes a
normative vision of what labour law ought to do or what its ideal scope should be. The selection
of a label involves the choice of a paradigm for the subject. This paradigm has in mind a central
case of the subject, which in this instance will be certain social and economic institutions and
how they ought to be regulated. This paradigm indicates boundaries for the subject, though of
course related topics can always be considered as well. The selection of a paradigm is not a
purely descriptive exercise. It is a normative judgement about what labour law ought to be
doing and how that task should be performed. The central case of labour law will be the best
example of that paradigm available. There will be marginal cases on the boundaries of labour
law, of course, but understandings of the subject will rely heavily on their orientation towards
the paradigm.
The selection of a paradigm may be motivated by a variety of moral and practical
considerations. At bottom, however, the selection of paradigm involves, we suggest, a
20

Mark Freedland and Nicola Kountouris, The Legal Construction of Personal Work Relations (OUP 2011).
Guy Davidov and Brian Langille (eds), Boundaries and Frontiers of Labour Law (Hart Publishing 2006); Guy
Mundlak, ‘The Third Function of Labour Law: Distributing Labour Market Opportunities among Workers’ in
Davidov and Langille (n 3); ACL Davies, ‘Identifying “Exploitative Compromises”: The Role of Labour Law in
Resolving Disputes Between Workers’ (2012) 65 Current Legal Problems 269; Guy Davidov ‘Setting Labour
Law’s Coverage: Between Universalism and Selectivity’ (2014) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 543; Alan Bogg
and others (eds), The Autonomy of Labour Law (Hart 2015).
21
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philosophical choice. The choice relies upon analysis of social and legal practices, but develops
a conception of labour law that presents the subject in its best light as a coherent and purposeful
undertaking.
The paradigm that is usually strongly associated with the label of ‘labour law’ concerns
collective labour relations. The normative vision within this paradigm holds that the best way
in which to combat an employer’s inequality of bargaining power and to provide a
countervailing force to capital is to promote and support collective bargaining on the part of
workers.22 Within this paradigm, labour law needs to establish the rights of workers to organise,
to strike, and to compel employers to come to the table and negotiate about terms and
conditions of employment. Provided that organised labour develops sufficient bargaining
power, collective agreements should on this view establish fair terms and conditions of
employment and mechanisms to ensure fair management of the enterprises through forms of
joint regulation with worker representatives, such as trade union officials. Supporters of this
agenda for labour law also assert that through collective organisations workers can achieve
voice at work and exercise a kind of industrial democracy. 23 In the middle of the twentieth
century, collective bargaining was typically the preponderant method by which the terms of
employment relations were fixed in advanced industrial economies. Collective agreements
were enforced either by a legal mechanism such as arbitration or a court or by the threat of
lawful industrial action. Based on this industrial context and the widespread development of
unions and collective bargaining, the paradigm of labour law focused on the rules of collective
labour relations between management and unions, and paid rather less attention to individual
contracts of employment or other forms of regulation.
In contrast, the paradigm association with the label ‘employment law’ places the contract of
employment at the centre of the subject. The core legal materials of employment law consist
not only of the legal rules governing the formation and enforcement of contracts of
employment, but also the variety of modern legislation and regulations that to some extent have
replaced collective bargaining as the principal mechanism for ensuring fairness at work.
Important regulations of this kind might include laws against discrimination, guarantees for
minimum wages, health and safety regulations, laws that place upper limits on hours of work,
and more generally regulations that protect employees against unfair treatment by employers
and against exposure to unnecessary risks. The label ‘work law’ extends the paradigm to people
who are not classified by the law as employees, but who nevertheless are economically
dependent on the sale of their services to others. The label ‘work law’ can also extend to unpaid
workers such as volunteers and prisoners.24 The normative vision behind these conceptions of
‘employment law’ and ‘work law’ views mandatory regulation that provides workers with

See e.g. Karl Klare, ‘Countervailing workers’ power as a regulatory strategy’ in Hugh Collins, Paul Davies and
Roger Rideout (eds), Legal Regulation of the Employment Relation (Kluwer Law International 2000); Keith
Ewing and John Hendy, ‘New Perspectives on Collective Labour Law: Trade Union Recognition and Collective
Bargaining’ (2017) 46 Industrial Law Journal 23. More broadly on the different roles of trade unions, see e.g.
Keith Ewing, ‘The Function of Trade Unions’ (2005) 34 Industrial Law Journal 1; Gillian Lester, ‘Beyond
Collective Bargaining: Modern Unions as Agents of Social Solidarity’ in Davidov and Langille (n 3).
23
Alan Bogg and Tonia Novitz (eds), Voices at Work: Continuity and Change in the Common Law World (OUP
2014).
24
Noah D Zatz, ‘The Impossibility of Work Law’ Guy Davidov & Brian Langille (eds), The Idea of Labour law
(OUP 2011); Noah D Zatz, ‘Does Work Law Have a Future If the Labor Market Does Not?’ (2016) 91 ChicagoKent Law Review 1081.
22
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legally enforceable individual rights as usually the best way to secure the goals of labour law.25
That view will be strengthened during periods when trade unions are weakened and collective
bargaining is ineffective to secure fair terms and conditions of work. That view can also be
undermined if the coverage of employment law rights becomes so diminished that a social
division emerges between those who benefit from a good package of legal rights and those
routinely or systematically excluded from legal protection. 26
Many other paradigms for labour law seem possible. Harry Arthurs has argued that labour law
should be discussed as part of a broader field of the law of economic subordination and
resistance.27 Feminists have frequently questioned whether the paradigm should be based
exclusively on paid work or whether it should include unpaid work in the home. 28 This
integration of paid and unpaid productive activities may also be described as ‘work law’. In
the German and French traditions, ‘social law’ (‘droit social’) takes broad issues of social
justice and insurance against economic security as a central normative theme and organising
paradigm.29 The law is envisaged as creating an ‘economic constitution’ that ensures the fair
operation of markets and the division of labour.30 On that approach, boundaries between public
and private law, and between employment regulation and social security systems dissolve, for
they are attributed with common objectives that include the promotion of an efficient labour
market and the protection of workers from the vicissitudes of market forces such as poor wages
and unemployment. This broad perspective of social law arguably informs the current
employment policy of ‘flexicurity’ of the European Union.31 It also informs many of the ideas
in the influential Supiot report that viewed employment regulation in the context of the whole
life-cycle of workers, from education and training to retirement and dependence on a pension. 32
That social and labour market perspective was also at the heart of the pre-industrial statutory
regulation of labour markets in England, which restricted the free movement of labour, fixed
wages, and regulated access to skills and good jobs.33
Boundaries between public and private law are also challenged when the subject is regarded as
being founded on human rights, an approach that is sometimes also called the

Hugh Collins ‘Against Abstentionism in Labour Law’ in John Eekelaar and John Bell (eds), Oxford Essays in
Jurisprudence: Third Series (OUP 1987).
26
See in this volume the chapters by Einat Albin, Mark Freedland, and Sabine Tsuruda.
27
See, for instance, Harry Arthurs, ‘Labor Law as the Law of Economic Subordination and Resistance: A Thought
Experiment’, (2013) 34 Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal 585.
28
Joanne Conaghan in this volume, and see Joanne Conaghan and Kerry Rittich (eds), Labour Law, Work and
Family: Critical and Comparative Perspectives (OUP 2005).
29
Léon Duguit, Le droit social, le droit individuel et la transformation de l’état (Social Law, Individual Law and
State Transformation’) (Presses Universitaires de France 1911). The German tradition was similar: Otto von
Gierke, The Social Role of Private Law (2016) (originally Die soziale Aufgabe des Privatrechts (Berlin 1889))
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constitutionalisation of labour law. 34 Philosophical justifications for human rights or for
treating rights as constitutional imperatives can be appropriated as arguments for the need for
labour law in the form of protection of human rights.35 This stance leads to debates about
which labour rights should be classified as human rights in constitutions. It also poses the
question of the extent to which traditional liberal rights, such as freedom of expression, should
be applied to the employment relation. Viewing the subject as a study of human rights at work
is connected to the idea that the employment relation resembles the power relation of an
authoritarian state over its citizens. If workers’ rights can be viewed as fundamental or human
rights, these are stringent entitlements with an increased moral and legal force. They can
therefore be a countervailing legal force against an employer’s power based on ownership of
private property. They may also ensure that workers’ essential interests are not sacrificed in
the political compromises of legislation. In this context, the judiciary plays a vital role in
defending workers’ rights, a task that some courts may be reluctant to perform. 36 The human
rights at work paradigm can also embrace the idea of transnational labour law.
In recent decades, the challenges posed by the economic forces of globalisation have been
understood to undermine the effectiveness of national labour laws.37 National laws may need
to be supplemented or even replaced by transnational or international labour laws, for only
such transnational laws may be capable of providing a bulwark against social dumping in the
context of rapid movements of capital investment and economic migration of workers.38
Studies of transnational labour law, such as EU employment law, typically pay special attention
to regulation of equal opportunities in labour markets, restrictions on the free movement of
workers placed by immigration laws, and protections for workers against capital restructuring
that intensifies in response to global pressures on domestic markets. As well as focussing on
the governance of labour markets, transnational labour law may also be grounded in respect
for human rights. The European Convention on Human Rights is providing a fertile source of
legally binding principles that require both respect for individual liberties in the workplace and
rights for collective organisation and bargaining. 39 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union appears to have an unrealised potential to reorient European Union labour law
towards respect for fundamental rights under the banners of equality and solidarity rights.
Keith Ewing, ‘Democratic Socialism and Labour Law’ (1995) 24 Industrial Law Journal 103; Virginia Leary,
‘The Paradox of Workers’ Rights as Human Rights’, in Lance Compa and Stephen Diamond (eds) Human Rights,
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Using these transnational sources of binding rights, together with international norms and
national constitutions, it makes sense to explore a new paradigm for labour law under the rubric
of ‘human rights at work’. 40
Although there is considerable continuity between the values and principles that motivate these
paradigms of labour law, employment law, work law, social law, human rights law, and
transnational labour law (which we will collectively refer to as labour law for convenience),
some differences emerge. These differences can be explored by philosophical enquiry. It may
be suggested, for instance, that the high value attached to individual rights, especially human
rights, comes to the fore in normative discussions of employment law rather than labour law,
because the focus in employment law is always on the individual employment relations. In
contrast, in the paradigm of labour law understood narrowly as collective labour relations, a
particularly important value is solidarity between workers doing the same jobs and ideally
solidarity between much wider groups of workers. Yet these differences should not be
exaggerated, for it is certainly possible to derive a strong argument for collective labour law
institutions from individual liberties, 41 and equally individual employment rights such as the
right to a minimum wage can be justified on the basis of collective considerations of
distributive justice. 42
One of the tasks of investigations into the philosophical foundations of labour law (in its
broadest sense) is to tease out these contrasting normative foundations buried within competing
conceptions of the subject. The exploration of the underlying values of the subject brings out
insights that unify it and challenge traditional assumptions.43 These elucidations should help
us to understand better what we believe should be the proper scope and purpose of the subject. 44

(c) Concepts in Labour Law
A third general task that philosophical enquiry will assist is the clarification of some of the
difficult concepts used in labour law. Labour law deploys a wide range of indeterminate and
contested concepts. This becomes evident, for instance, when examining labour rights that are
classified as human rights, and is also true of human rights law more generally. There are a
number of controversial examples. Consider, for instance, the right to work. The United
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), states at Article 24 that ‘[e]veryone
has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work
and to protection against unemployment’. Does this mean that everyone should have the work
of their choice? Or that everyone should have non-exploitative work? Some scholarship has
attempted to explore the meaning of the right to work, sometimes using philosophical ideas for

40
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this purpose, such as the idea of self-realisation that is achieved through work.45 The right to
rest and leisure, including a right to paid holidays, in Article 24 of the UDHR has also been
debated in theoretical scholarship, with some saying that it does not belong to a list of human
rights,46 and others suggesting that denial of this right would violate human dignity. 47
Or consider the right to ‘just and favourable remuneration’. Article 23.3 of the UDHR
proclaims that ‘Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring
for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if
necessary, by other means of social protection.’ How should we understand this idea of just
and favourable remuneration? Does it mean no more than that workers should be paid the going
market rate for their labour? Or does the reference to a life worthy of human dignity mean that
workers should receive a living wage, even if it exceeds the market rate for the job? Or does
the principle merely require the state to supplement earned income when it falls below the
poverty line for a family?
Friedrich Engels thought that the whole idea of advancing claims for a fair wage was nonsense,
because it seemed to amount to no more than a claim for the poverty wages of the going market
rate.48 Yet it is possible to attribute a more determinate and principled meaning to the idea of a
just wage. There are several conceivable routes towards developing a coherent concept of the
idea of a fair wage. One possibility is to consider what the difference might be between a fair
wage and exploitation.49 Yet that strategy inevitably raises the further contested question of
what counts as exploitation.50
We cannot understand and assess these difficult and contested concepts without considering
their moral meaning. This endeavour cannot only be a technical enterprise of putting together
the different interpretations that courts have adopted or that the drafters of the legislation and
international conventions may have preferred. A dictionary definition of the concepts will also
not suffice, because the dictionary cannot do our moral thinking for us.51 To understand these
concepts, we need to uncover the principles of political morality underlying them.52 Answers
to complex questions such as the ones that labour lawyers address can only be discovered by
considering a range of principles that justify labour law. In some instances of the exploration
of concepts, as in the case of exploitation, we are trying to understand better the variety of
meanings that have been signified by the word in order to dispel confusion and assist in
normative arguments about how to address the problem of exploitation.53
In other instances, the exploration of words is not as significant perhaps as the normative
enquiry into what the word ought to mean in its particular legal context. For example, when
45
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the European Court of Human Rights is asked to rule on the meaning of the right to freedom
of association, it views its task as not merely providing a choice between the variety of possible
meanings, but rather its considered view about how the European Convention on Human Rights
ought to protect the activities of trade unions with respect to collective bargaining and industrial
action. Similarly, in these philosophical explorations, the answer to reflections on the meaning
of hard concepts depends in part upon the normative goals that one might wish to attribute to
the law.

2.

The Relevance of Theories of Justice

In relation to some other fields of the law, the search for the normative foundations of the
subject has been conceived rather narrowly. For example, in relation to contract law, the
principal idea has been that the moral duty to keep one’s promises provides the essential moral
justification for the law enforcing contracts.54 Although this idea has many opponents and
encounters difficulties in accounting for the law of contract, it provides a focus for discussion
of the moral foundations of the law of contract that confines the field to a branch of moral
philosophy. Similarly, an influential (though by no means as dominant) theoretical approach
to tort law has been to insist that its role is merely to protect existing legal rights, not to attempt
to secure policy goals such as the reduction of accidents or the device of insurance spread
accidental losses throughout the community as far as possible. These focused approaches to
investigations of the normative foundations of branches of private law are not imitated in labour
law. Though perhaps attractive to libertarians examining the employment relation, a narrow
moral enquiry has rarely appealed to most labour law specialists, who prefer to link labour law
to a more capacious set of values.
Why should labour law look more broadly into moral and political philosophy for its normative
foundations than many other legal subjects like contract law and tort law? The answer seems
to be that labour law presupposes and builds on the institutions of private law such as contract,
tort, and property law with a view to adjusting the governing rules in particular instances.
Labour law assumes that the parties enter into a contract when they form an employment
relation. Labour law assumes that private ownership provides the explanation of why an
employer has control over the capital assets of the business. Private law provides some kind of
framework for governing work relations, but this legal framework is certainly not the same as
the distinctive legal fields of labour law and employment law that developed in the twentieth
century. The normative justification for labour law must therefore reach beyond the
justifications for private law rules and discover more compelling arguments and justifications
for partly overriding those private law rules with different, often mandatory, regulations. In
other words, the justice achieved by the application of the ordinary rules of private law is
regarded by labour lawyers as an inadequate scheme of justice for the employment relation and
associated institutions. In the search for normative foundations, labour lawyers therefore reach
for other schemes of justice. Those that come most readily to hand are to be found in general
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political theory, in which there are many candidates for explanation of the key elements of a
just society and system of government.
These broader values may be loosely described as theories of social justice. These theories of
social justice seek to describe, justify, and promote moral principles that will achieve justice in
a given society (or more broadly the world) with regard to the distribution of wealth, power,
opportunities, freedoms, and other capabilities and material that we have reason to value as
part of enjoying well-being and a valuable life. 55 Political theories of the state, justice, the
constitution, fundamental rights and the idea of the rule of law consider how best (morally) to
construct a framework for such a just society deserving of our obedience to its laws. But do
those insights about the nature of a just society and its appropriate form of government have
anything to tell us about how labour law should address the more concrete, limited issues, with
which it is typically concerned, such as the legal framework for collective bargaining,
protection of workers against unjust dismissal or unfair discrimination, and minimum wages?
Can we derive valuable and credible insights for labour law from the abstract discussions of
justice provided by liberal political philosophy? Labour lawyers believe that the need for labour
law as a specialist branch of the law is intimately linked to conceptions of social justice.
Scholars have also examined political theories of democracy at state level, and their
implications for the governance of the workplace. In democratic theory, the central idea is that
‘in a certain kind of human association, the process of government should as far as possible
meet democratic criteria, because people involved in this kind of association possess a right,
an inalienable right to govern themselves by the democratic process’.56 Workplace
participation has also been grounded on democratic theory with the key idea being that the
workplace is a political system itself, and individuals in this political system should be able to
exercise control in the way that they are governed in this context, in a manner analogous to the
control that they exercise at state level. 57 Labour law scholarship has provided a justification
for workplace participation on the basis of democratic theory. 58
Other kinds of theoretical approaches to an examination of labour law are of course possible.
A critical historical approach seeks to uncover the structures of ideas and perhaps their internal
contradictions and development.59 A social theory approach might seek to understand how
labour law contributes to social cohesion or social disorder. Such an approach grounded in
sociology might also cast doubt on the coherence or validity of concepts that seem to be taken
for granted in the deliberations of moral and political philosophy. 60 Feminism has also provided
a powerful critique of the paradigm of labour law and how it conceives the key issues. 61
Although there are elements of these different methodologies in the contributions to this
volume, most of the contributors have reached for political philosophy as their inspiration for
reflection on the foundations and normative scope of labour law.
55
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3.

The Perils of Appropriating Political Theory

Having made the case for the necessity of political theory when reflecting on the philosophical
foundations of labour law, we should acknowledge that we may encounter difficulties in
applying some of these ideas and theories of justice to an enquiry into the foundations of labour
law. There may be a risk of some kind of unsatisfactory transplant in the sense that ideas,
concepts and principles designed to address one set of questions in political philosophy will
not function well or in a similar way when they are applied to resolve issues about the
normative foundations of labour law. Some political theorists have specifically discussed the
labour relationship. Philosophical literature has examined directly workers’ exploitation, for
instance.62 However, most political theories focus on the role of the state in relation to its
citizens. Is it problematic to apply this kind of analysis directly to the employment relation? It
may be helpful to distinguish the different ways in which we might borrow insights from
political theory to help to establish the normative foundations of labour law. There seem to be
three possible strategies in making what might be called the transplant from political theory to
labour law: (a) methodological imitation; (b) re-application of key concepts of political theory;
and (c) exegesis of implicit positions.
(a) Methodological imitation
The first approach is to copy the methodology from a particular political theory, such as the
work of John Rawls on justice,63 and then apply the method to construct a just system of labour
law.64 Imagine an ‘original position’ of the kind envisaged by Rawls, where the task is for
everyone to agree the rules about the institution of employment and its legal regulation. Behind
a ‘veil of ignorance’, no-one knows if they will be an employer or an employee, a senior
manager, an agency worker, or regular employee or a casual worker etc. They understand how
the economy works in general and that the division of labour is required for reasons of
efficiency, and that some savings on transactions costs can be achieved by granting one party
to a contract the power to direct the performance of the other. What kinds of rules and
institutions would reasonable people agree in this artificial situation that is designed to rule out
considerations of self-interest?
This approach using (broadly speaking) Rawls’s methodology was applied by Jackson with
respect to the law of corporate insolvency. 65 The question is what a hypothetical meeting of
creditors of a company would agree to be the fair rules for the distribution of assets in the event
of insolvency between the various groups of creditors. That approach can work reasonably well
in the context of insolvency, because in the end the issues are all about money and the allocation
of risks of loss. In labour law, things are not so simple, because the parties in the original
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position would have to reach agreement on such issues as power, fairness, and self-affirmation
through work, as well as the distribution of resources.
Where might the Rawlsian methodology take us with respect to the normative foundations of
labour law? Rawls’s general objective was to avoid both a libertarian position in which there
is minimal government and redistribution, but also to avoid a general reliance on utility as a
comprehensive guide to justice. His methodology in effect seeks to protect fundamental rights
and minimum standards of welfare, but to avoid detailed imposition of programmatic welfare
policies. If the economic argument that the structure of the contract of employment provides
an efficient use of labour power is correct and accepted by the parties to the original position
with respect to labour law, the general features of the institution of employment, including the
subordination of the employee to the employer’s demands for performance, would be broadly
preserved by the parties in the original position. However, it seems likely that they would also
want some guarantees against the abuse of power by employers and at least protections against
oppressive economic arrangements of the kind found in sweatshops. Perhaps, if sufficiently
risk averse, people in the original position would also agree to a law requiring ‘fair wages’ or
at least a ‘living wage’. Rawls’s emphasis on the point that the protection of rights or civil
liberties would be a key outcome of agreement in the original position might also lend support
to the argument that the participants in the original position would agree to the protection of
the human rights of workers at work, which might not only include rights such as freedom to
manifest a religion and the right to freedom of expression, but also extend to the right to work
and the right to freedom of association including the right to join a trade union.
There are, of course, many other kinds of methodologies apart from Rawls’s original position
that can be employed in political theory. Some start from some basic moral ideas, such as
respect for human rights, and seek to elaborate the consequences of deriving the structures for
a just society by reference to that idea. This methodology could be applied to labour law by
exploring the implications of founding labour law on the protection and elaboration of human
rights in the context of the workplace, an agenda explored by several authors in this volume.66
Instead of human rights, the powerful motivating idea behind labour law might be ascribed to
freedom,67 or equality,68 or dignity,69 or some other widely acknowledged fundamental
political principle, such as Sen’s capabilities approach. 70 There has also been a strong utilitarian
or welfare theme in labour law in which maximising general wealth has been a guiding
methodology, as in the example of regulating the employment relation for the purpose of
maximising the competitiveness of businesses.
Are there problems or dangers in using the methodology of political theories? The main danger
derives from the difference in purpose of political theory and investigations of the philosophical
foundations of labour law. Political theories usually start with very minimal conditions or
assumptions that avoid making many presuppositions about human nature and the world and
how social systems work. They try to justify their theories of justice or liberty on the basis of
a few core principles and basic assumptions about human nature and the social organisations
66
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of human beings. Although the presuppositions may be more numerous than appears at first
sight, the strength of a political theory is often regarded as lying in its ability to generate
interesting and plausible conceptions of justice out of relatively minimal assumptions.
In contrast, when we are looking for the normative foundations of labour law (or indeed some
other branch of law), though we may be interested in the implications of first principles and of
views about human nature, we also need to keep a focus on what measures we find in the
existing labour laws and employment law. We are looking for the normative foundations of
something that already exists, albeit perhaps in a flawed form. We cannot start from a basic
principle and ignore the question of whether its implications actually have much fit with the
current law. Unless we are content to let the methodology of political theory take us far away
from the kinds of labour laws that we actually have, we need to recognize that the search for
normative foundations of labour law is to some extent a different kind of enterprise. It is an
interpretive exercise in the sense articulated by Ronald Dworkin:71 we are examining an
existing human institution and trying to explain it by presenting it in its most coherent and
morally compelling form. Moral principles and concepts can be drawn from political theory,
but it is a mistake simply to impose them on the existing practices known as labour law whether
or not they fit and explain them. We are looking for an interpretation of labour law that presents
it in its best light, not proposing a new theory of justice that has some application to work
relations.

(b) Re-application of Key Concepts.
A second kind of use of political philosophy is to copy some of the key concepts in a particular
political theory and apply those concepts to employment law and associated institutions such
as collective bargaining. Conceptions of democracy might be applied to collective bargaining.
The value of protecting particular human rights such as privacy or freedom of expression could
be applied to the terms of contracts of employment. These transplants of concepts of moral and
political theory into interpretations of the foundations of labour law may produce genuine
insights, but there are evident dangers in trying to use the same concept in two different
contexts – abstract theories of justice or other moral ideas, on the one hand, and interpretations
of labour law, on the other, without placing adequate weight in the particularities of the
employment context.
For example, in what have been called ‘republican’ theories of freedom and justice,72 the
central claim is that the main purpose of a constitutional framework for a society is to minimise
the exercise of uncontrolled power by one person or group over all the others. The prerogative
power of a king provides an example of such arbitrary power. To prevent such domination by
a monarch or later on a dictator, a political theorist in this stream of republican thought might
support various proposals including strict observance of the rule of law by all including the
most powerful, democracy as a mechanism of control and accountability, constitutional
Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Harvard University Press 1986).
Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (OUP 1977); Cecile Laborde and John
Maynor (eds), Republicanism and Political Theory (Blackwell 2008); Frank Lovett, A General Theory of
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government, and perhaps more generally measures designed to prevent people acquiring
domination or at least too much dominating power over others. Observing the many successes
of such a republican theory of government, we might attempt to reapply these notions of
domination and constitutional government to employment relations and an interpretation of the
foundations of labour law. 73 Such an endeavour is encouraged by republican theorists
themselves, who sometimes liken the powers of an employer to those of an arbitrary dictator. 74
We could say plausibly enough that employment relations are a situation where there is
considerable potential for the exercise of domination by one party (the employer) over the other
(the worker). Employment law could be seen as an appropriate ‘republican response’ to
domination. In pursuit of the application of republican ideas to labour law, it might be
proposed, for instance, that the law should include, amongst other things, tight regulation to
prevent the abuse of power by employers and managers, some kind of democratic
representation or voice at work, and, in an endeavour to reduce the amount of domination that
is produced in the employment relation, it might also lead to measures to fix fair basic standards
such as a minimum wage and maximum hours.
Another example of re-application of key concepts might be attempts to justify the moral
foundations of labour law on the idea of human rights. Some human rights documents were
perhaps originally conceived as establishing primarily civil and political rights that would be
exercised by individuals against their governments. Even so, many of these human rights
documents, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, had some references to social
and economic rights, including labour rights, so they might help to provide some foundations
for labour law. Furthermore, some general civil rights and freedoms such as rights to dignity,
liberty and equality, can be used to justify a variety of legal structures including rules regarding
the employment relation.
Are there problems or dangers in transplanting the key concepts of moral and political theory
to provide an explanation of the normative foundations of labour law? The problem that may
be encountered is that a concept such as ‘domination’ or ‘human rights’ or ‘capability’ may be
taken out of its original context and given a new meaning with a whole set of fresh implications.
Although it may appear that the original political theory has provided the key concepts in a
proposed account of the normative foundations of labour law, it may be the case on closer
inspection that the meaning of the concepts has changed in significant ways when they are reapplied to labour law. With respect to domination for instance, the question is whether some
important dimensions of the concept alter as we move the context from the unbridled power of
an arbitrary dictator to apply it to the more powerful party to the contract of employment. 75
In relation to human rights, some theories examine duties imposed primarily on state
institutions, while others examine duties imposed on everyone. 76 When considering these
theories, do the key concepts of human rights alter when we shift the context from claims that
sovereign states should not be permitted to violate the human rights of anyone in their territory
73
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to a claim about the proper limits of the employer’s power? For instance, does the meaning of
the right to privacy change when it is used by employees against an employer’s intrusive
surveillance or testing as opposed to its similar uses by public authorities?77 Furthermore, is it
even appropriate to think that private employers should have the same duties to respect and
promote human rights as those undertaken by institutions of the state? On this issue, it can be
said that employers have duties of justice on the basis of their role in the institution of
employment. In any case, in this volume, since we discuss labour law, our primary focus is on
the role of the state in delivering principles of social justice through the regulation of the
institution of employment.
This change of meaning in the transfer from theories of justice to their application to labour
law may have sometimes happened with the concept of capability used by Amartya Sen. His
attack on material and pecuniary notions of welfare and wellbeing that were used by
international financial institutions was justified by reference to his idea of the greater
importance of positive freedom to achieve meaning for one’s life, an idea that he called
‘capability’.78 In the same way, we might transpose the idea of ‘capability’ to provide
normative foundations for labour law by saying that in the pursuit of fairness or justice at work,
labour law should be concerned with not only material conditions of work produced by
inequality of bargaining power, but also with a worker’s opportunity for self-realisation
through work.79 Whilst this line of enquiry looks promising, it is unclear where it leads. Is it
possible, for instance, to move from that philosophical position about the importance of the
value of positive freedom in any judgement about welfare, to an assertion that labour law needs
to have certain kinds of protective rights or should protect some basic labour rights of workers?
In the context of a theory of justice, the idea of capability seems to be an aspirational goal and
a measure of whether a situation has improved or not. It does not appear to provide conceptual
apparatus for a programmatic theory of justice that might provide concepts and guides to an
elaboration of a principled discussion of labour law. Improving the capabilities of individuals
may indeed be a worthwhile goal, but it is unclear how it might be applied to help to fix
minimum standards and entitlements of employees.
The difficulties of the transplantation and adaption of ideas and concepts drawn from political
theory and applied to labour law provide a fertile source of debate, distraction, and perhaps
misunderstanding. The investigation of the ensuing problems can provide a valuable source of
insight in itself. We should not be concerned that ideas drawn from political theory may not
prove fruitful or inspirational. The concern voiced here is rather that those ideas will often be
subjected to unacknowledged or unconscious transformations, so that the link to the original
idea may sometimes be tenuous at best.

(c) Exegesis of the principles of political theories
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It is rare that political philosophy engages with normative questions about labour law. There
may be some broad principles that may be obviously relevant, such as a stress on equality of
opportunity that can certainly support some employment rights, not least laws against
discrimination, or the prohibition of exploitation that can support other employment rights,
such as a fair wage. In order to address this problem that political theory offers little by way of
explicit guidance about labour law, the third strategy linking political theory and labour law
holds that some rules or broad principles about labour law are already implicit in the leading
works of political theory, even though they may not have been drawn out explicitly by the
original authors of the theories of justice. The task becomes one of proposing a close reading
of these works on political theory in order to discover clues about their implicit recipe for
labour law’s rules and principles. It is also possible within this framework to argue that
although there is no direct textual support for a particular aspect of employment law, a
particular rule or principle is inherent in the explicit statements of the authors, or is an inevitable
consequence of the adoption of a particular explicit statement in the political theory.
For example, it might be claimed that Rawls’s theory of a ‘basic structure’ that provides a
guarantee of fairness in civil society contains within it the rudiments of a scheme for
employment law. Rawls’s theory holds that in the original position the parties would agree to
certain guarantees about civil liberties, democracy, equal opportunities, and minimum
standards of welfare. Rawls recognizes that free markets are valuable as generators of material
goods, but that they may also lead to gross disparities of wealth. It is clear that he envisages
that the system of taxation and public welfare policies would address those gross disparities.
What Rawls does not say, however, is whether he would regulate markets and market
transactions to prevent those gross disparities of wealth and perhaps other problems of injustice
from arising. On one view, there is no need to regulate the market or interfere with freedom of
contract if there is an effective progressive system of taxation and generous welfare payments;
on the opposite view, which is often associated with Gerry Cohen, 80 regulating the market and
controlling contracts was surely envisaged (implicitly) by Rawls as another tool for preventing
gross disparities from arising. On the former view, therefore, there is no reason to have, for
instance, a minimum wage law, for the government and its system of welfare will (under the
rules of the basic structure) rectify labour market outcomes by some kind of tax credit or inwork benefit system; on the latter view, it would be irrational for Rawls and those seeking to
follow his general theory of justice not to support a minimum wage, for that legislation prevents
very efficiently the worst disparities in wealth and income from arising at source. 81 There are
many possible positions within this spectrum between complete freedom of contract and
detailed regulation of contracts including employment relations. Much turns on the extent to
which it is accepted that private employers should have any duties at all with respect to securing
distributive justice. All of these positions may find some textual support in the work of Rawls,
so we should be cautious when trying to extrapolate from these abstract philosophical ideas to
For a variety of views of this kind: Gerry A. Cohen, ‘Where the Action Is: On the Site of Distributive Justice’
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propose normative standards for labour law. It is certainly worth reflecting upon what insights
might be gained about the normative foundations for labour law by extrapolating from political
theories, but we are unlikely to obtain determinate answers.
Another problem may arise from a close reading of the texts of a political theory for clues about
the normative foundations of labour law. We may discover that the author of the political theory
has endorsed two important principles, both of which have obvious applications to the kinds of
issues that arise in labour law. The problem is rather that these principles clash in the particular
instance of labour law, and the political theory offers no obvious way in which to reconcile
these competing principles. For instance, the political theory may endorse free markets and
freedom of contract as a general principle that is conducive to autonomy or positive freedom,
but also endorse protections against exploitation or demeaning work. If we cannot discover any
clear indications within the theory about how to reconcile these principles, perhaps by giving
one priority over the other, we will only extract indeterminate guidance from the political
theory. In a sense, the political theory may only state at a higher level of abstraction the problem
with which labour law may be wrestling without offering any further guidance about a process
or method for resolving the issue in line with a general theory of justice.
It is suggested that problems of linking political theory to labour law will be a common issue
when we investigate the philosophical foundations of labour law. The detailed kinds of
questions that interest those seeking to find the normative foundations of labour law will simply
not be answered except in broad terms. In the case of Rawls, we cannot be sure what he might
have wished to say about labour law. It may be fun and enlightening to have intelligent
disagreements about what he ought to have said, given his general position on the principles of
justice, but these arguments are unlikely to deliver firm conclusions.

4.

Towards a General Theory?

Assuming that we can navigate safely around those methodological reefs of drawing on
political and moral philosophy to help to elucidate the foundations of labour law, there remains
the question of what outcomes might be expected from these investigations. Is deeper reflection
on the philosophical foundations of labour law going to produce a general theory of the
principled foundations of the subject and an associated clear paradigm for the subject that
together might be regarded in some sense as a conclusion to this line of thought? Some
contributors to this volume might be read as having that ambition. 82 More commonly the
contributors may be read as articulating views about what should be regarded as the principal
aim of labour law, without denying that other aims and principles could be sensibly
incorporated into labour law as well.
In the foreword to the volume, however, Harry Arthurs, speaking from long experience, pours
cold water on the ambition to develop a general theory, let alone a new general theory. He
describes the scholarly efforts to develop philosophical principles for labour law as a kind of
alchemy, a task that fascinates brilliant minds, but which has failed to secure much of value for
the working class, and perhaps like alchemy it is bound to fail. Indeed, Arthurs points out a risk
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that the elegant theories will somehow end up legitimising a system of subordination and
exploitation of ordinary people rather than providing a vision for the reconstitution of a market
society with radically different foundations. Looking at the contemporary world, he fears that
the success of radical libertarian and populist ideologies have led governments not only to seek
to dismantle labour law as an instrument of social justice but also to abandon social justice as
an aim of politics altogether. His advice is to parry these ideas with equally bold, broad, and
deep principles such as human rights, liberty, democracy and justice, but not to tie ourselves to
one particular value as a lodestone.
Willingly following that advice, the editors commissioned papers for a conference and
ultimately this volume that sought to explore a wide range of principles, theories, themes and
values. The book is divided into four parts, each representing what seems to us to be a key set
of values that need to underpin any labour law system. Part I engages with values that are
particularly associated with liberal political theories, such as freedom, dignity of the individual,
and the protection of human rights, and examines how they underpin labour laws. Part II
considers how labour law addresses the task of securing distributive justice in society and of
seeking to eliminate exploitation. Part III investigates how the workplace can and should
become a site for democratic values and participatory government. Part IV asks how labour
law can contribute to social inclusion for all groups in society, including women, without
becoming an exclusionary force itself. This inaugural volume cannot, however, aspire to be
comprehensive. What it claims rather is that it has identified and begun to explore four of the
key fields of moral and political values in which labour law can make a significant contribution.

5.

Part I: Freedom, Dignity, and Human Rights

The chapters in Part I of the book explore whether justifications for labour law might be found
in liberal values. Values such as autonomy, dignity, human rights, and freedom from
domination and alienation have been close subjects of study in political theory, where the focal
relationship is that of citizens to the state and the objective is to identify and justify the
desiderata of a just society. Earlier we discussed some of the hazards of transplantation, such
as whether the theories of a just state vis à vis its citizens can be generalised to the more private
or localised relationships of employers to employees. The opening chapters take on these and
other questions in their rich and provoking contributions to this collection.
The first of these chapters confronts the challenge of reconciling the apparent contradiction
between the rejection of authoritarianism in the relation of citizen to state and the apparent
toleration of parallel risks in the relation of employee to employer. John Gardner argues that
as employment relations have shifted from status norms to a more contractarian ethos, the risks
of worker alienation have increased. By contractualising roles and relationships, Gardner
argues, the values intrinsic to vocations, such as the meaningfulness of one’s work, the
satisfaction of putting one’s talent to good use, developing one’s potentialities, and the like,
have been subordinated to the impulse toward getting one’s money’s worth. Work has become
less about pride, he argues, and more about sacrifice; this, in turn, begets resentment on the
part of the worker and loss of motivation. The worker’s loss of motivation further leads the
employer to redouble its assertion of authority, and so on, in a self-reinforcing cycle toward
the ultimate process of alienation of the worker.
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Hugh Collins similarly presses the question of why, if a political regime that suppresses core
liberal values such as freedom, dignity, privacy and equality would be seen as authoritarian
and abusive, we should be untroubled by the autocratic features of the contract of employment.
His answer: we should be troubled. Collins considers the tension between the institution of
contract and several core liberal values: negative liberty (freedom from interference by the
state), positive liberty (autonomy), non-domination, and equal respect. He shows how the
contract of employment undermines these values to greater and lesser degrees, but ultimately
identifies as most directly fatal to liberal values in the workplace the inherently hierarchical
structure of the contract of employment. Collins advances this claim through the clarifying
analytic device of distinguishing between submission to the contract of employment and the
subordination that is intrinsic to the relationship. Submission to contractual terms in a variety
of contexts may do no harm from a liberal perspective; the trouble is that subordination – the
requirement of obedience to the employer’s will and the attendant assertion of hierarchy – is a
pervasive feature of the contract of employment and of necessity deprives the employee of the
value of equal respect.
Other chapters look to political theory to explore the purpose of labour law. There is a growing
body of scholarship suggesting that law can advance human development, capacities, or
capabilities. Capabilities might include health, education, reason, conscience, and the ability to
work and act in the spirit of solidarity – all resources that enable people to lead a life to which
they attach value. These capabilities have intrinsic value, but they also can be instrumental in
advancing human freedom. Can the goal of increasing capabilities provide a justification for
labour law? Pablo Gilabert explores the requirements of human dignity, a concept commonly
appearing in human rights instruments but which is often underspecified. He argues that
protecting dignity involves ‘solidaristic empowerment,’ whereby a good society does not
block, and ideally facilitates, the development and exercise of critical human capacities. Labour
rights, by Gilabert’s reckoning, are norms that advance the ideal of solidaristic empowerment
in the workplace by supporting a range of basic interests linked to capacities, such as access to
consumption goods, associational power, self-development, a feeling of contribution, selfesteem, and so on.
Brian Langille, who also takes a capabilities approach, stresses that it is not only what set of
capabilities one has that matters, but also how one comes to have them. Collective bargaining,
for example, facilitates a “process” aspect of the freedoms and opportunities important to
human development. But Langille’s focus is labour standards. His analysis of several recent
leading court decisions from Canadian labour jurisprudence lauds approaches to statutory
interpretation that seek to vindicate the remedial purpose of the statutes. This approach asks
who is best situated to advance a statute’s purpose, rather than whether a duty was required by
contract – the latter framework being rife with problems of avoidance and exclusion. It is this
more pragmatic and purposive jurisprudence, he argues, that can best remove obstacles to
freedom and advance human development.
The tradition of civic republicanism might similarly help provide a moral foundation for labour
law. A common thread in civic republican accounts – and one that gives them particular appeal
for labour lawyers – is the assertion that citizens are entitled to be free from domination. Some
theorists see this as flowing from the value of liberty while others link it to conceptions of
social justice. Despite its origins in efforts to establish criteria for the limits of state power in
relation to citizens, Cabrelli and Zahn argue in their chapter, the appeal of non-domination
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theory is its ready generalisability to relations in the private sphere, including the workplace.
The types of labour regulation that might be justified by non-domination theories could depend,
however, on whether one’s theory is grounded in liberty values or social justice. Liberty-based
theories might justify procedural protections to enable collective action and worker
participation in managerial decision-making, while other forms of labour law – e.g. minimum
wage, equal pay, and working time regulation – can be understood as concerned with the
minimisation of domination as a matter of social justice. A non-domination framework, they
argue, might free us from the limitations inherent in the construct of the ‘employment’ relation
as a basis for regulation and justify extension of protections to independent contractors and
other workers who fall outside the employment paradigm.
Finally, Atkinson illuminates both the allure and the limitations of looking to human rights to
provide a normative justification for labour law. The challenge, in part, lies in the contestation
among theorists of the very foundations and imperatives of human rights, with political
approaches seeking to classify human rights as rights the violation of which justifies state
intervention with a sovereign state, and more naturalistic accounts seeing human rights as
protecting ‘personhood,’ or the ability to choose one’s own conception of the good life.
Moreover, even if one could resolve such conflicts, the fit between human rights and labour
rights may prove quite imperfect. Human rights are seen as timeless, universally applicable
norms of the highest moral order, while many labour rights are quite particularised and
workaday in character. Atkinson ventures that while an unlikely candidate to serve as a general
theory of labour law, human rights might at least offer an arrow within a more pluralistic quiver
of normative foundations.

6.

Part II: Distributive Justice and Exploitation

As was said earlier, academic scholarship often refers to the inequality of bargaining power
between the employer and the worker as the central issue that labour law seeks to address. Less
frequently perhaps, scholars refer to employment as an institution that distributes wealth and
power in modern societies.83 By intervening in the employment relation, then, we do not only
seek to make workers and employers more equal: we also aim to promote a vision of social
justice and fair distribution of resources both in the workplace and in society more broadly.
Against this background, the second part of the book examines, first, the implications of
theories of distributive justice for labour law. Distributive justice involves questions of how
political, economic, and social institutions and laws should distribute burdens and benefits in
society. Scholarly debates on distributive justice explore questions such as what is to be
distributed (for instance opportunities or material resources), on the basis of what principles
there should be redistribution (for instance different conceptions of equality or desert), and who
should benefit from this redistribution (for instance individuals or groups).
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A society’s laws have significant effects on the distribution of resources. Perhaps the area of
law that most obviously deals with redistribution of resources is tax law.84 A state’s tax system
addresses how resources should be redistributed in order to promote principles of distributive
justice. Contract law rules can also serve to redistribute resources.85 In this volume, Guy
Davidov considers the application of theories of distributive justice to labour law, and examines
what interventions through labour legislation each of these theories support. He first outlines
theories of distributive justice that are based on desert, namely on the responsibility of
individuals as a basis for what treatment they should receive. On this view, each person’s
contribution or effort should form the basis for the resources that they should receive. Luck
egalitarianism, in turn, insists that people should not suffer consequences because of their bad
luck, and argues that distributive justice should address such issues. The chapter also presents
theories of redistribution as addressing inequality, according to which redistribution should
eliminate existing disadvantage. It considers what is to be redistributed according to the
relevant theories, and explores redistribution as instrumental to equality of status. Having
reviewed these different approaches, the chapter considers what labour laws each theory
justifies and requires, including legislation on anti-discrimination, trade union and collective
bargaining protection, unfair dismissal and minimum wage. Moreover, the chapter examines
the implications of employing these theories in order to address unjust distribution between
different groups of workers.
Like many contributors to this volume, Davidov takes a broad account of the scope of labour
law, and considers individual and collective labour law, as well as anti-discrimination law as
parts of it. Noah Zatz, on the other hand, presents and challenges the traditional accounts on
the foundations of anti-discrimination law and labour law, and examines the insights that we
gain from this exercise. He explains how the traditional narrative of labour law focuses on
inequality of bargaining power in the labour market, and the principle that ‘labour is not a
commodity’ as a way to address this. Employment discrimination law, on the other hand,
focuses on employers who, because of bias, do not treat workers as market actors, and aims to
purify market dynamics. Zatz considers the bilateral employer/employee relationship as the
central focus of attention in both fields of law, and puts forward a more structural analysis. He
suggests that the wrong that anti-discrimination law addresses is the arbitrary distribution of
opportunities for work and income. This move brings employment discrimination law closer
to labour law. At the same time, it brings insights to labour law by questioning its exclusive
focus on market structures and highlighting relationships that are typically viewed as falling
outside the labour market.
When is workers’ treatment exploitative? It is to this question that the three chapters that follow
turn. When considering exploitation, a natural starting point is the theory of Karl Marx. For
Marx all workers are exploited in a capitalist system, because they do not have access to the
means of production. On this account, they are exploited when they work more hours than it
takes to make goods that they can buy with their earnings. This theory of exploitation does not
examine distributive justice at a general, macro-level, but is concerned instead with unfair
distribution of resources within the employment relationship. Yet some of the crucial insights
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from Marx involve the role of structures in creating conditions of exploitation. Political
philosophy has examined the concept of exploitation both by developing Marx’s account and
by departing from it. Some philosophers examine interpersonal exploitation, disconnected from
background structures, while others focus attention on structural conditions that make workers’
exploitation possible.86
The contributions to this volume give primary attention to structures of exploitation. Jonathan
Wolff examines the concept’s structure and normative implications. He addresses the puzzle
that often the only thing that is worse than being exploited is not being exploited: for many
people, the alternative to having low wages and bad working conditions is having no wages at
all. How then shall we determine if people are exploited if they are better off than they would
be had they not been exploited? To determine this, we need to consider background norms.
Wolff broadens the Marxist inquiry from the specifics of the structural problems of the
employment relation, to the background structures that give rise to the particular exploitative
relations. These broader structures, he argues, will have a key role to play in our attempt to
understand if the particular relation is exploitative. Having explained that exploitation has two
aspects – first the treatment of the worker, and second the background structures that create
vulnerability – he suggests that it can be addressed in two ways. We can tackle exploitation
either by regulating working conditions through offering a minimum wage and other such
protections, or, more ambitiously, by changing the background structures that create
vulnerability through, for example, educating groups of people who are in a position of
vulnerability. On this latter issue of structural injustice, he emphasises that even when
background structures are legitimate, this does not mean that there can be no limits to the
powers that flow from them.
In the chapter that follows, Virginia Mantouvalou continues this attention to the role of
structures, but focuses on the role of the law in particular as an institution that creates special
vulnerability to exploitation. She questions the current accounts of exploitation that we find in
law and policy, which emphasise extreme violations of labour rights, pay special attention to
interpersonal relations, and focus on criminalisation as a legal response. Building on Marxian
insights, she examines structural accounts of vulnerability to exploitation, and considers
particularly the role of the law in creating special vulnerability, which is exploited by violating
workers’ rights or other human rights. Mantouvalou suggests that against this background, it is
not only individual employers who have to be held accountable for exploitation, but also the
state itself for its role in creating these unjust structures. She suggests that human rights law,
with its focus on state conduct, can expose some forms of exploitation, and labour law can
address the problem by incorporating rules that remove workers’ structural vulnerability, and
protect them from oppressive subordination.
In the final chapter in this part, Horacio Spector sets out to define the meaning of the concept
of fair compensation, which is implied in provisions such as Article 7 of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, by reference to the idea of exploitation.
Article 7 of the Covenant provides, inter alia, that everyone has a right to fair and just working
conditions, including fair wages that secure a decent living standard. To examine what is fair
in this context, he discusses different accounts of exploitation, before putting forward a risk
theory of exploitation grounded in contemporary economic theory. He suggests that labour
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exploitation is a structural feature of modern capitalism because of the allocation of risks in a
market economy. In this context he places attention on workers who, against a backdrop of
unemployment, are risk averse for the reason that they risk significant losses in case of nontransaction. Capitalists, on the other hand, have many ways in which they can spread the risk
by investing in stocks or bonds, for instance. The workers’ inequality of power, understood in
this way, leads them to accept wages that they would not accept if the risks were distributed
equally. Capitalism gives the opportunity to exploit systematically workers’ aversion to risk.
Spector suggests that the right to a fair wage should be understood as a right to address the risk
imbalance that is inherent in capitalism. The same can be said about the role of labour law as a
whole: it can be seen as a mechanism that addresses the imbalance of risks.

7.

Part III: Workplace Democracy and Self-Determination

The third theme of the book concerns the support given by labour law for democratic values.
That support might be directed towards the workplace or towards national and international
political activities. In the workplace, the values of democracy might explain and justify the
need for representation of the workforce at key decision-making bodies of the organisation.
The workers should have a voice in influencing all the different decisions that might affect
them from the obvious claims to be interested in wages and other terms of employment to the
more remote strategic goals and ethical conduct of the business. Outside the immediate
workplace, workers may contribute to the functioning of democratic government by their
formation of political parties and other associations that represent the interests of workers or
particular groups of workers. It is also possible to observe at the transnational and international
level how federated trade unions, as associations of workers’ organisations, can join councils,
committees, and other consultative mechanisms to help to set the agendas and guide the
outcomes of their deliberations about international labour standards.
In most countries, the principal mechanism through which workers represent their interests in
the workplace is collective bargaining between their employer and a recognised trade union.
There may also be works councils that provide a forum for discussion of a broad range of
issues. Is collective bargaining or a works council a form of democratic representation? It is
clear that these institutions differ from the political process in government that relies on
candidates belonging to political parties standing for election for office and power. By seeking
recognition for the purpose of collective bargaining, a trade union is not seeking to replace
management but merely to compel it to reach decisions that respect and protect the interests of
the workforce. Inside trade unions themselves, there is likely to be competition for office
between different personalities and factions, though these rival groups are unlikely to share the
organisational and membership qualities of political parties. When we speak of workplace
democracy, therefore, we are not making an analogy with the political process but rather
drawing on the underlying ideas of democratic government that include respect, equality, and
self-determination. The emphasis must be on the idea that individual workers should have a
say in how their business is run and the objectives it pursues without taking over the governance
of the organisation.
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Although this idea of workers having a voice and the possibility of participation in decisionmaking seems a rather loose demand that might be easily satisfied by some kind of consultation
mechanism in the workplace, many employers resist even this amount of worker participation.
Claims for worker voice are seen as antithetical to the claims of management to govern the
workplace. Management insists that its power to govern is conferred by the employer’s
ownership of the means of production. Thus claims for voice at work must address the tension
between the employer’s reliance on the entitlements of private ownership and the workers’
claim, based upon values of respect, equality, and self-determination, to have a voice in the
management of the business.
Given the reluctance of most employers to concede voluntarily the need for employees to be
able to express their views about the conduct of management, effective employee voice is likely
to depend upon the power of workers to compel the employer to listen to their concerns. Labour
law may be able to induce employers to sit and listen to representatives of the workforce in
collective bargaining and works councils, but it is much harder for the law to compel a
recalcitrant employer to listen and act upon the concerns of the workforce. In order to have an
effective voice within the employing organisation, workers generally have to use their
economic power as well as their legal rights. Their ultimate economic power is to take industrial
action and refuse to work until the employer lists and accedes to some of their demands.
Many employers take the further view that such strike action is itself morally wrong. Industrial
action can be presented as interfering with the entitlements attached to private ownership of
businesses or at least attempting to induce management to change direction. Trade unions are
criticised by employers by interfering with their business and their contractual relations by
inducing workers to go on strike. The common law accepted this point of view and decided
that a union leader who led strike action was committing a tort. Legislation was needed to grant
trade unions immunity from this tort. But is strike action morally wrong? Is there not a right to
strike that competes with an employer’s entitlements based on property rights?
Alan Bogg and Cynthia Estlund contribute to the collection by considering the moral basis and
strength of the right to strike. Drawing on the perspective that labour law can be based on
respect for human rights, they argue that the right to strike is a fundamental right resting upon
three basic liberties: freedom from forced labour, freedom of association, and freedom of
expression. In turn they explain that the importance of these civil liberties can be explained and
justified by the republican ideas of freedom and contestatory citizenship. 87 They then use those
philosophical foundations to explore how the basic regulatory questions of a 'right to strike'
have been addressed in Canada, the UK, and the US.
Turning to the relation between workers’ organisations and politics in the government of the
state, Martin O’Neill and Stuart White make the case for using associations like trade unions
to help to insulate political structures against the influence of the wealthy. Associations of
workers can act as conduits for information and lay the basis for political participation. They
can also help to mobilise mass preferences in favour of social legislation that addresses such
concerns as the precariousness of work and the need for benefits such as health care. 88 Labour
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law can help to stabilise and protect such associations, but there is clearly a role for the state to
try to cement these alternative routes for political participation into the democratic processes.

8.

Part IV: Social Inclusion

Our fourth theme examines the idea of social inclusion as a philosophical foundation for labour
law and particular aspects of regulation of employment. This theme of social inclusion is part
of the concern to identify how and in what ways distributive justice is an aim of labour law. It
explores the ways in which labour law may be regarded as one of numerous institutions and
legal measures in the modern state that aim to distribute power and wealth fairly. That task has
already been addressed to some extent within the theme of exploitation, though not all
conceptions of exploitation are concerned with distributive questions and some address rather
different issues such as those concerned with human rights in exploitative relationships. The
theme of social inclusion is primarily concerned with distributive issues, though it concerns
not so much the distribution of wealth as the distribution of other valuable interests including
the distribution of good jobs.
It was earlier said that within political theory, distributive aims are often described by reference
to various conceptions of equality. For instance, the distributive aim in a theory of justice might
be described as equal treatment for everyone, or equal opportunities for all, or equality of initial
resources, or equality of welfare or well-being, or some other standard of equality. A more
complex approach to distributive justice, though one still influenced by ideas of equality, is to
permit some inequalities in wealth and power to exist in society, but only to the extent that
these disparities function ultimately to the benefit of everyone. Rawls provides an example of
that kind of flexible egalitarian principle in his proposed second principle of justice, which as
well as requiring equality of opportunity, states that: social and economic inequalities should
be arranged so that they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged. 89 Such a principle
of justice might prove interesting if it were used to assess the justice of arrangements within
productive organisations. According to that ‘maximin’ principle, we might ask whether the
disparities of power and income within an organisation accrue to the greatest advantage of the
lowest paid workers at the bottom of the hierarchy of the organisation. Assuming that this
principle could fairly be applied beyond the ‘basic structure’, it seems unlikely that many large
organisations could meet that demanding principle of justice.
In contrast to ideas of distributive justice based on different conceptions of equality, a recent
strand in political theory puts forward the idea of social inclusion as a possible distributive aim
for theories of justice. This idea is open to a number of interpretations, but it is reasonably clear
that it does not use the scales of justice provided by some measure or conception of equality,
because its objective is defined in terms of minimum standards rather than equal standards.
Furthermore, the ambition of the idea of social inclusion seems to be broader, because it is not
solely aimed at a fair distribution of power and wealth, but is also concerned with securing
social order and acceptance of the legitimacy of government and the law.
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Great disparities of wealth and power tend to undermine social cohesion. If a society contains
a substantial group of people who lack material necessities, who cannot obtain economic
security or improve their lot in life, and who lack any effective political representation, it risks
social disorder and even revolution. The aim of social inclusion to help people feel more
integrated into society and to feel that it is worth their while to uphold the institutions of their
society including its government and laws. Measures to address social exclusion may include
material support by the state, but in accordance with a goal of social inclusion governments are
more likely to prioritise the creation of decent jobs open to all, the opportunity to participate in
political institutions and government, and effective policies to enable everyone to be able to
benefit from the educational and cultural dimensions of society. The aim of social inclusion
prioritises those goals concerning work, education, participation in social institutions, over
narrower attempts to relieve poverty and to make people more materially equal. One way to
present the aim of social inclusion is to present a list of minimum opportunities and outcomes
that must be accessible to every person such as education to their full potential, decent work
according to their capabilities, and real opportunities to have a voice in matters that affect them.
Usually the first task for governments who are aiming to increase social inclusion is to try to
make sure that everyone has a paid job. Having a job not only meets many material needs such
as food and shelter, but it also integrates the worker into an organisation or a network through
which the worker can establish social relationships, self-esteem, and a sense of belonging to
the group and society as a whole. The most obvious relevance to labour law of this goal of
social inclusion is that it suggests that priority should be given to the distributive goal of getting
everyone a paid job no matter what disadvantages they may suffer from. Not only do laws
against discrimination match into that distributive goal, but also other legal measures such as
family-friendly provisions that permit parents and carers to arrange their working time around
their other pressing responsibilities. The priority to be attached to this goal of maximising
access to paid work by reason of maximising social inclusion is challenged, however, at least
in part, by contributions to this volume.
In her contribution to this volume, Joanne Conaghan questions the central importance attached
to paid work in the thinking of labour lawyers. Adopting a critical historical perspective, she
points out how the division between home and workplace arose during the industrial revolution.
This division was used, she argues, to justify a patriarchal society with the subordination of
women in the home where they performed unpaid work, whereas men were treated as free and
equal participants in a labour market that offered paid work. Although paid work was thus a
gendered construct, she welcomes to some extent the opening up of opportunities for women
in recent decades, whilst recognising that caring responsibilities are for the most part still not
shared equally between men and women, so there remains a powerful exclusionary effect for
women. More fundamentally, however, she challenges the idea that paid work for everyone
should be the measure of success in the policy of social inclusion on the ground that it is a
historically constructed male norm. It is possible that economic developments such as
teleworking may break down the separation between work and home, which in turn may
facilitate a reintegration of work and social reproduction.
As that discussion of paid work as a boundary of labour law’s protections illustrates, whilst a
goal of labour law or at least some parts of labour law may include social inclusion, it is also
true that labour law inevitably draws lines around the scope of application of employment
rights. Laws that set minimum wages, maximum hours, and health and safety rules do not apply
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to every kind of work that is performed. In the gig economy, for instance, where people agree
to perform particular tasks on a casual basis, the normal conditions for the application of
employment rights may not be satisfied for various reasons, such as the absence of a contract
with the putative employer. Alternatively, if there is a contract, it may be the wrong kind of
contract such as a contract for services, or the short duration of the engagement may exclude
the application of relevant legislation, or some other condition for the entitlement may not be
satisfied. Unfortunately, in most cases, the workers who are excluded from many of the
protections that workers in good jobs enjoy are precisely those workers who tend to be excluded
in a more general sense from the opportunities provided by society. Einat Albin illustrates this
point by reference to domestic workers. She is also critical of the narrowness of the goal of
social inclusion. Using the example of sex workers, Albin argues that current definitions of the
policy of social inclusion would emphasise the importance of making such work legitimate and
paid and regulated according to the standards applicable to other kinds of jobs. She argues that
such a conception of the goal of social inclusion overlooks the significance of the way in which
sex workers are degraded by their work. She advocates therefore a broader conception of social
inclusion that also prioritises humanitarian concerns.
Another group who are typically excluded from labour law because they do not perform paid
work are volunteer workers. In most legal systems, the absence of payment will have the legal
consequence that they are excluded from employment protective rules such as the minimum
wage and also legal rights to become a member of a trade union and to organise and bargain
collectively. As Sabine Tsuruda points out in her contribution to this volume, volunteers may
nevertheless perform exactly the same range of tasks as regular paid employees and suffer from
many of the problems that employees suffer in the workplace such as discrimination,
harassment, abusive treatment by managers, and risks to health and safety. Tsuruda accepts
that it is appropriate to exclude some volunteer work from employment protections, but only
when that volunteering satisfies a condition that she describes as ‘merit inclusivity’, which
means that it provides opportunities not available in the labour market for people to use their
skills and abilities. For instance, interns working in many organisations as volunteers are
functioning as free substitutes for paid labour, rather than being granted the opportunity to
develop their skills and capabilities, in which case they should be entitled to the minimum wage
because their work does not satisfy the criterion of ‘merit inclusivity’.
In the final contribution to this book, Mark Freedland tackles the question of how ideas of
social inclusion can address the complex issues faced by migrant workers, who may be
excluded by either employment law rules or immigration law rules or a complex interaction of
both sets of rules.90 Freedland argues that the policy of social inclusion applied as a goal for
labour law can be expressed as including within its scope all personal work relations that merit
worker-protective regulation and assigning classifications of different kinds of work relations
that uphold worker-protective regulation in a proportionate way. He recognises the many
different kinds of challenges presented to this aim by current kinds of precarious work
relationships, not least zero-hours contracts and sham self-employment. Immigration law also
tends to function to exclude workers, though in a way that can be justified by reference to a
particular interpretation of the aim of social inclusion that treats its citizens as those who must
be included, not others. This ‘us’ and ‘them’ mentality of populist immigration law, 91 however,
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seems ultimately to run counter to the aim of other possible understandings of the goal of social
inclusion, which might be linked more closely to the appeals to social solidarity that lay at the
foundation of the Declaration of Philadelphia in 1944. 92

9.

Conclusion

This brief introduction has mainly focussed on some of the challenges that the contributors to
this volume have faced in exploring the relatively uncharted terrain of the philosophical
foundations of labour law. We have explained how we hope that careful reflection about
underlying moral and political principles and values can serve to provide firmer foundations
and a clearer sense of direction for labour law. At a time when many appear to doubt the value
of labour laws and workers’ rights at all, we believe it is necessary to reassert that the values
and principles that provide the foundations for a system of labour law are not those of a narrow
special interest group, but rather embrace interpretations of key values such as freedom,
autonomy, dignity, equal respect, democracy, and social justice. Exploitative labour conditions
are simply incompatible with key values that most of us share. But more fundamentally, many
of the contributions explain how even the basic building blocks of the division of labour such
as contracts of employment must be engineered and regulated so that they do not interfere with
those key values in a disproportionate way. We hope that readers of this volume will agree that
labour law does need philosophical foundations and that elements of those foundations have
been uncovered by the contributors.
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